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Human Rights and National Security:
The Strategic Correlation
William W. Burke-White∗

For most of the past ªfty years, U.S. foreign policymakers have largely
viewed the promotion of human rights and the protection of national security as in inherent tension. Almost without exception, each administration
has treated the two goals as mutually exclusive: promote human rights at
the expense of national security or protect national security while overlooking international human rights. While U.S. policymakers have been motivated at times by human rights concerns, such concerns have generally been
subordinate to national security. For example, President Bush’s 2002 U.S.
National Security Strategy speaks of a “commitment to protecting basic human
rights.” In the same document, President Bush makes it clear that “defending our Nation against its enemies is the ªrst and fundamental commitment
of the Federal Government.”1 This subordination of human rights to national security is both unnecessary and strategically questionable. A more
effective U.S. foreign policy would view human rights and national security
as correlated and complementary goals. Better protection of human rights
around the world would make the United States safer and more secure. The
United States needs to restructure its foreign policy accordingly.
This Article presents a strategic—as opposed to ideological or normative—argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more
prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation
between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity
to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to
U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts
of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait ªfty years later. Evidence from the post–Cold War period
∗ Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; Ph.D., Cambridge (expected
2004); J.D., Harvard (2002); M.Phil., Cambridge (1999); A.B., Harvard (1998). The author wishes to
thank Michael Boyle, Colleen Burke, Ieva Kalnina, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Jesse Tampio, and the participants in the International Conference on the Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, Qom, Iran, for
their comments, suggestions, and assistance. For ªnancial assistance the author is grateful to the Jesus
College Cambridge Research Fund.
1. President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the
United States (Sept. 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [hereinafter National Security Strategy] (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
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indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens’ human
rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that
improvements in various states’ human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can
signiªcantly enhance U.S. and global security.
Since 1990, a state’s domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling
indicator of that state’s propensity to engage in international aggression. A
central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of
peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression.2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new
tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A
strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result
in a number of important policy modiªcations. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identiªed as presenting the
greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such
states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent
through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it
provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from
aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human
rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights
abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it
offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.
In some cases this linkage yields only minor changes in actual policy—for
example, greater scrutiny of particular states with troubling human rights
records or an increased emphasis on human rights in our bilateral dialogues
with some states. However, where human rights have largely been marginalized by national security concerns, such as in U.S.-China or U.S.-Russia
relations, the strategic linkage could be reason to focus on—rather than
overlook—human rights abuses in Chechnya, Tibet, and elsewhere.
Part I of this Article considers the present structure of U.S. human rights
policy and its perceived tension with national security. Part II analyzes the
instances of the aggressive use of force in the post–Cold War world and suggests a correlation between domestic human rights repression and interstate
aggression. Part III considers the possible avenues of causation that could
account for the observations in Part II. Part IV explores how recognizing the
correlation between domestic human rights abuse and international aggression would change U.S. foreign policy.

2. Most recently this position has been articulated by President George W. Bush: “We will defend the
peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on
every continent.” President’s Commencement Address of June 1, 2002 at the United States Military
Academy in West Point, New York, 38 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 945 (June 10, 2002).
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I. The Traditional Separation of Human Rights
and National Security
Since the birth of the human rights movement in the mid-twentieth century, the promotion of human rights has been seen as competing with or
even compromising core issues of national security. Promoting human rights
has long been viewed as a luxury, to be pursued when the government has
spare diplomatic capacity and national security is not being jeopardized. In
the words of a former member of Congress, there is a deeply held belief
within the U.S. government that “there will always be a tension between our
foreign policy as classically deªned in terms of the United States’ economic,
political, and strategic interests and our human rights interests.”3 The result
of this perceived competition has often been the marginalization of human
rights in U.S. foreign policy.
Though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly on December 10, 1948,4 it was not until the end of
the Vietnam War that human rights issues entered into the foreign policymaking calculus.5 Between 1973 and 1976, new Congressional legislation
forced the executive branch to begin to address human rights issues, requiring the President to submit to Congress human rights reports on those
countries receiving foreign aid.6 Nonetheless, human rights remained on the
sidelines of foreign policymaking. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s wellknown view that the international advocacy of human rights was incompatible with national security7 manifested itself in his resistance to, and partial
refusal to comply with, the new Congressional reporting requirements.8
The subordination of human rights to national security has manifested itself in the past three decades of U.S. foreign policy. This is not to say that
human rights never motivate U.S. foreign policy. In some cases, such as the
1999 intervention in Kosovo or the pressure on South Africa throughout the
late 1980s, human rights were a driving factor. Rather, the point is that human
3. Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong. 254 (1980) (statement of Bruce P. Cameron, Foreign Policy Legislative Representative, Americans for Democratic Action).
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71(1948).
5. See John Shattuck, Diplomacy with a Cause: Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy, in Realizing Human Rights: Moving from Inspiration to Impact 265, 269 (Samantha Power & Graham Allison
eds., 2000) (observing that “in the 1970s, amid discontent over Vietnam, Watergate, and U.S. support
for dictatorships . . . , Congress began to assert itself with a louder voice in the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process” advocating issues such as human rights). Before that time, “U.S. ofªcials ªltered
human rights diplomacy through the prism of Soviet containment policy,” preventing it from becoming
an independent foreign policy force. Id.
6. See id. at 269–70.
7. See United States Institute for Peace, U.S. Human Rights Policy: A 20 Year Assessment (1999), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990616.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) (noting that
“Carter rejected the linkage argument used by Kissinger, which held that promoting human rights jeopardized other foreign policy goals”).
8. See Shattuck, supra note 5, at 270.
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rights policies have generally given way in a perceived competition with
security concerns. As David Forsythe states: “a variety of domestic factors in
the United States combined after the Cold War to ensure some attention to
human rights in foreign policy, but also to ensure that the government did
not pay a high price to see those principles advanced in world affairs.”9
Under the leadership of President Carter, it appeared to many that human
rights would move to the center of U.S. policymaking, yet this goal was
never realized. Although Congress created the post of State Department Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in 1976, and President Carter elevated the position to an Assistant Secretary level,10 the position has “had little special clout in most administrations whether Democrat
or Republican.”11 In his inaugural address, Carter declared: “our moral sense
dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an
abiding respect for individual human rights.”12 Nonetheless, in implementation if not rhetoric, national security goals were still viewed as conºicting
with the human rights agenda. Carter’s Secretary of State remarked to Congress in 1977 that “we must balance a political concern for human rights
against economic and security goals.”13
During the ªrst eleven months of the Reagan Administration, the position of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights was left vacant,14 and human
rights policy was largely subjugated to the ideological battle with communism. As three leading nongovernmental organizations observed in 1982,
“The Reagan Administration has cheapened the currency of Human Rights
by invoking its principles to criticize governments it perceives as hostile to
the United States and by denying or justifying abuses by governments it
perceives as friendly . . . .”15 Take, for example, El Salvador, which, at the
time had a brutal and repressive government. The Reagan administration
continued to certify the government’s human rights record so as to be able
to provide military assistance in the on-going conºict with socialist Salvadoran rebel forces.16 A similar pattern is seen with countless other states.17
9. David P. Forsythe, U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights: The Price of Principles After the Cold War, in
Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy 24 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2000).
10. The post was established through Section 301 of the International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976. See Shattuck, supra note 5, at 270.
11. See Forsythe, supra note 9, at 21, 26.
12. James Earl Carter, Inaugural Address, Pub. Papers: Jimmy Carter 3 (Jan. 20, 1977). Similarly,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor, expressed a determination to “demonstrate the
primacy of the moral dimension of foreign policy.” Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle 81
(1985).
13. Secretary Cyrus Vance, quoted in American Association for the International Commission
of Jurists, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: The First Decade, 1973–1983, at 21 (1984).
For example, while “human rights performance became a dominant factor” in relations with some Latin
American states, “such considerations were clearly subordinate in weighing military aid to Egypt, Israel,
North Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.” Id.
14. United States Institute for Peace, supra note 7.
15. America’s Watch et al., The Reagan Administration’s Human Rights Policy: A MidTerm Review (Dec. 10, 1982).
16. Id. at 21.
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Jack Donnelly observes that Reagan’s policies “reveal a deep reluctance to
sacriªce even minor economic interests, let alone security interests, for human rights.”18
Though President Clinton stated in 1997 that “advancing human rights
must always be a central pillar of America‘s foreign policy,”19 human rights
remained subordinate to national security. Human rights advocacy gave way
to economics in the U.S. relationship with China.20 Though Clinton was
eventually willing to risk U.S. lives in Bosnia, where there was a security
interest in European stability, he was unwilling to do so in Rwanda.21 As
Samantha Power observes: in order “to avoid engagement in a conºict that
posed little threat to American [security] interests” the Clinton Administration engaged in an “almost willful delusion that what was happening in
Rwanda did not amount to genocide.”22
Even today, human rights concerns continue to be subordinate to national
security issues.23 Possibly the most obvious explanations of current policy
are the September 11 terrorist attacks and the new American perception of
vulnerability. If Americans believe they are under threat and human rights
are viewed in competition with national security, it is no surprise that protecting the homeland will trump human rights promotion. Despite the growing role of the human rights movement, the critical element in “determining
American foreign policy is what assets—bases, intelligence and diplomatic leverage—it can bring to bear against Al Qaeda,” Iraq, and other states seen as
threats to the United States.24
While the 2002 National Security Strategy speaks about advancing human
rights, its “focus is protecting America.”25 The rhetoric and reality of the
2003 Iraq war and occupation afªrm that the Administration’s “priority will
be ªrst to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership.”26

17. See generally id.
18. United States Institute for Peace, supra note 7.
19. President William J. Clinton, Remarks in New York City Commemorating the 50th Anniversary
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2 Pub. Papers 1732 (Dec. 9, 1997), available at
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19971210-10278.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
20. President Clinton repeatedly renewed China’s most favored nation trade status despite signiªcant
criticism of its human rights record. See David E. Sanger, Support Shrinks for China’s Trade Status, N.Y.
Times, June 4, 1999, at A19.
21. See Clinton, supra note 19.
22. Samantha Powers, Why The United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen, Atlantic Monthly,
Sept. 2001, at 84, 104.
23. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, Editorial, Is the Human Rights Era Ending?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2002,
at A25 (observing that “Western pressure on China to honor human rights, never especially effective, has
stopped altogether. Chinese support for the war on terror has secured Western silence . . . .”).
24. Id.
25. National Security Strategy, supra note 1, at 7.
26. Id.

254

Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 17

II. Human Rights and Aggression in the Post–Cold War World
Though national security has largely trumped human rights in the formulation of U.S. policy, this is not necessary, appropriate, nor even strategic.
Rather than being competing goals, human rights and national security are
in fact complementary. This section seeks to demonstrate a correlation between domestic human rights abuses and interstate aggression in the post–
Cold War period. Three basic hypotheses result:
1. States that systematically abuse human rights at home are most likely
to engage in international aggression.
2. States with average or good human rights records are unlikely to engage in international aggression.
3. Human rights respecting states may still engage in international interventions (usually in conformity with international law) at least in part to
protect the human rights of citizens in a state that seriously and systematically abuses the rights of its own citizens.27
If this suggested correlation is accurate, a foreign policy that actively advances human rights around the world can enhance both national and global
security by decreasing the number of states likely to engage in international
aggression and the destabilizing consequences associated therewith.
Clearly, this argument is closely linked with the democratic peace hypothesis—namely that democratic states will not go to war with one another.28
However, it highlights as causal an often underappreciated element of the
democratic peace literature—a state’s institutionalized and actual respect for
its own citizens—and uses that element to make a policy argument. The
very concept of “democratic peace” is largely a short-hand reference to a
number of different traits that characterize democracies—the nature of elections, institutional safeguards, or the normative beliefs democracies tend to
hold. As Michael Doyle observes: “Liberal states, founded on such individual
rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private
property, and elected representation are fundamentally against war.”29 The
human rights peace argument presented here draws on this element of insti27. The claim here is not that human rights will be the exclusive driver of such interventions or that
interventions will occur in every case of human rights abuse, but rather that when interventions occur,
human rights will play a genuine, though probably not exclusive, role.
28. John Owen has argued that “liberal ideas [as mediated through liberal institutions] cause liberal
democracies to tend away from war with one another, and that the same ideas prod these states into war
with illiberal states.” John M. Owen, How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace, Int’l Security, Fall
1994, at 87, 88. For further reading on the democratic peace hypothesis, see generally Michael W. Doyle,
Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 Phil. and Pub. Aff. 205 (1983); David A. Lake, Powerful
Paciªsts: Democratic States and War, 86 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 24 (1992) (presenting an institutionalist explanation for the democratic peace based on rent-seeking); T. Clifton Morgan & Sally Howard Campbell,
Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight? 35 J. Conºict Resol.
187 (1991) (explaining the democratic peace based on decisional rules in democracies).
29. Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1151, 1151 (1986).
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tutional safeguards and actual practices that protect their citizens’ human
rights. Such states may or may not be democracies though they, by and
large, have and uphold liberal constitutions. The claim here is that far more
important than whether a state is “democratic” is whether it protects the
basic rights of all its citizens through a form of constitutional liberalism.30
An important caveat is necessary before turning to key cases. It is neither
intended nor possible here to demonstrate a statistically signiªcant correlation between domestic human rights abuse and interstate aggression. The
post–Cold War time period does not provide sufªcient data for statistical
proof of correlation.31 Nonetheless, as this analysis draws on one of the
speciªcations of “democratic states” in some of the democratic peace literature—namely the institutionalized freedoms and rule of law—that literature
buttresses the statistical relevance of the argument presented here.32
A few key deªnitions must be speciªed before proceeding.33 In order to
minimize possible deªnitional criticism, this paper takes a very thin
deªnition of human rights and a restrictive position on what constitutes a
human rights abusing state. It employs what Michael Ignatieff refers to as
human rights as “agency” or “negative liberty”—the “capacity of each individual to achieve rational intentions without let or hindrance.”34 Such an
approach implies that individuals must be able to “choose the life that they
see ªt to lead . . . within the broader frame of cultural and religious beliefs
they live by.”35 For human beings to possess such agency they must, at a
minimum, have freedom of thought and freedom from extrajudicial infringement on their bodily integrity. It is not necessary to the core argument
to investigate in great detail the human rights policies of the states in question.36 Telling indicators of a state’s human rights record are Freedom
30. By “constitutional liberalism” Fareed Zakaria refers to the “tradition . . . that seeks to protect an
individual’s autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source—state, church or society.”
Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom 19 (2003). He stresses the “tension between constitutional
liberalism and democracy,” noting that “constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power; democracy is about its accumulation and use.” Id. at 101–02.
31. This time period has been chosen because the end of bipolar balancing has produced a qualitatively different set of conºicts and interventions than existed prior. This choice, however, yields a very
limited data set based on the number of aggressive conºicts in the period. Therefore the approach here is
to show correlation through brief case studies rather than to engage in statistical analysis. Though this
methodology is necessary, its drawback is that it cannot isolate alternative variables such as economic
development, governance structures, or minority composition.
32. While this has been an element of some of the democratic peace literature, it has rarely been singled out as causal and never framed in human rights terms or used to develop an alternative foreign
policy. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 28, at 99 (suggesting that “structures that protect the right of each
citizen to self-government” including “[f]reedom of speech” are a necessary component of the democratic
state for the purposes of democratic peace literature). Future studies might reexamine democratic peace
data sets to isolate human rights protection as a causal variable.
33. The democratic peace literature has been subject to some criticism for choosing deªnitions that
selectively exclude certain troublesome questions. See Owen, supra note 28, at 87.
34. Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry 57 (2001).
35. Id.
36. Rather than catalog a series of particular events and episodes, this Article relies on composite data
produced by governments, NGOs, and international organizations. Most of the cases of human rights
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House’s annual surveys of freedom in the world, and particularly Freedom
House’s civil liberties ªgures, which are closely correlated with basic human
rights protection.37 Similarly, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch
(HRW), and the U.S. Department of State produce annual country-speciªc
human rights data.38 Taken collectively, the overall ªndings of such studies
can give a clear indication of whether a state is systematically violating the
most basic human rights.
Aggression is equally challenging to deªne—neither the U.N.’s International Law Commission nor the International Criminal Court (ICC) Preparatory Commission has been able to reach a deªnition.39 For the purposes of
this paper “aggression” will be deªned as the violation by one state of the
territorial integrity of another state with military force, not in self defense,
not authorized by the U.N. Security Council or not undertaken with a broad
international coalition and granted ex-post ratiªcation by the Security
Council.40 In arguable cases—such as the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq—this
paper will consider the implications of both including and excluding a particular case from classiªcation as “aggression.”

abuse discussed herein are sufªciently egregious that all these indicators point in the same direction,
making a composite analysis both straight-forward and reliable. Where indicators differ, however, this
analysis draws on those that speak most directly to a state’s human rights policy.
37. The civil liberties index quantiªes “the freedoms to develop views, institutions, and personal
autonomy apart from the state.” Freedom House, Freedom in the World: 2000-2001, Survey
Methodology, at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/methodology.htm (last visited
Nov. 8, 2003). Freedom House ratings consist of two numbers on a scale of one to seven, one being most
free, seven being least. The ªrst number reºects a state’s political rights and the second its civil liberties.
Id. See also Freedom House, Freedom House Country Ratings: Annual Survey of Freedom,
Country Scores 1972-73 to 1999-2000, at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/ (last visited Nov. 8,
2003).
38. See Amnesty International, Annual Reports, available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/
aireport/index.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003); Human Rights Watch, Reports by Country,
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/world/index.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003); U.S. Dep’t of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, available at http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/hr/c1470.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
39. For example, the International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996) indicates that individuals should be held accountable for the crime of aggression, but fails to provide a deªnition thereof. Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996, Vol. II,
Part 2: Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its Forty-Eighth Session, Draft Code
of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 2(2), art. 16(1), at 18, 43. UN DOC
A/51/10 (1998). For the difªculty faced by the ICC in reaching a deªnition, see generally the United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Ofªcial Records, Vol. III, Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, at 14-15, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. III) (2002). In 1999, Germany submitted its
proposal on deªning aggression in Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (1999),
UN Doc PCNICC/1999/INF/2 [hereinafter Compilation of Proposals]. See also The Deªnition of Aggression
and the ICC, 96 Am. Soc‘y Int‘l L. Proc. 181 (2002).
40. This deªnition draws particularly on the revised German proposal submitted to the ICC Preparatory Conference which deªnes aggression as “initiating or carrying out” an “armed attack . . . in [manifest] contravention of the Charter of the United Nations [as determined by the Security Council] . . . .”
Compilation of Proposals, supra note 39, at 10. The deªnition implicitly allows for ex-post ratiªcation of
arguably aggressive acts by the Security Council. This element of the deªnition is open to debate and
may exclude certain key cases such as the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq.
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The major international conºicts since 1990 are: the 1990 Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait; the 1991 U.S.-led Gulf War; the 1995 U.N. intervention in
Bosnia; the 1998–2003 war in Congo; the 1999 war between Ethiopia and
Eritrea; the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo; the 2001 U.S. attack on
Afghanistan, and the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq.41 A number of these
conºicts are explicitly excluded from this study as they are not acts of international aggression as deªned above.42 The 1991 U.S.-led Gulf War and the
1992–1995 U.N. intervention in Bosnia were both authorized by the U.N.
Security Council and are therefore not within the deªnition of aggression.43
The 2001 U.S. attack on Afghanistan was a legitimate act of self-defense
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and recognized by Article 5 of the
NATO Treaty.44 It is therefore also excluded. Although the 2003 U.S. war in
Iraq was, arguably, undertaken with a broad international coalition and subsequently referenced by the Security Council,45 it is treated here as an act of
aggression as the Security Council has yet, as of January 2004, to fully endorse the conºict.
The ªrst major act of interstate aggression in the post–Cold War era was
the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. On August 2, 1990 three elite Republican Guard divisions entered Kuwait and soon reached the capital. The violation of Kuwait’s territorial integrity was a clear breach of Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter and constituted an act of international aggression.46 Over the
next six months, Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait and caused signiªcant damage to the country’s population and infrastructure. A massive international
response led by the United States resulted in the February 1991 liberation of
Kuwait.

41. See, e.g., Monty G. Marshall & Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conºict 2003: A Global
Survey of Armed Conºicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy 13 (2003),
available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/PC03web.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
42. Note also that the conºict in Kashmir between India and Pakistan is not included despite frequent border clashes as it has not resulted in prolonged open hostilities in which one state has clearly
violated the territorial integrity of the other through the use of military force. While border ªghting has
occurred, international aggression as deªned herein has not.
43. See S.C. Res. 678, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990) (authorizing the use of
“all necessary means” to ensure the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait); S.C. Res. 743, 47th Sess., 3055th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992) (establishing the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia).
Moreover, the intervention in Kosovo was ratiªed ex post by the Security Council. S.C. Res. 1244, 49th
Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999) (deploying a U.N. mission in Kosovo) [hereinafter
S.C. Res. 1244].
44. Article 51 authorizes the use of force in self-defense. U.N. Charter, art. 51. See also Statement by
the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 15, 2001), at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2004).
45. See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N.SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003). The
coalition included the U.S., U.K., Spain, Australia, and Poland among others.
46. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 reads: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Although Saddam Hussein
claimed Kuwait was a part of Iraq, Kuwait’s independence was widely recognized and it was a member of
the United Nations. See S.C. Res. 661, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/6661 (1990).
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At the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had an appalling human
rights record. In 1990, Freedom House rated Iraq a 7,7 (the worst on its
scale) and declared it a “not free” state.47 At the time of the invasion, Saddam’s regime had been condemned for “gross human rights violations committed on a massive scale in Iraq affecting all sectors of society.”48 These
violations included the use of systematic police violence and the deployment
of chemical weapons against Iraqi citizens as well as the suppression of basic
rights.49 The Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights
Situation in Iraq from 1994 speaks to numerous examples of “political killings” and “cruel and unusual punishments” since 1990.50 Without the need
for further detailed analysis of these violations, it is clear that in 1990 Iraq
seriously and systematically violated the basic human rights of its own
population and engaged in international aggression against Kuwait.
The second aggressive interstate war since 1990 was the conºict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo from 1998 to 2003. With the fall of Mobuto
Sese Seko in 1997, the new Congolese government under President Laurent
Kabila began to lose territory to the rebel organization, the Congolese Rally
for Democracy (RCD). Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda all backed
the rebel movement to various degrees.51 During the ensuing civil war in
Congo, elements of the militaries of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda entered
Congo, engaged in military activities on its territory, and, at times, occupied
Congolese territory.52 Angolan forces entered Congo ostensibly to aid Kabila’s
government. Though no state was a clear aggressor in the conºict, since
Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, and Uganda all engaged in military violations of
Congo’s territory, they will each be treated as aggressors for purposes of this
analysis.

47. Freedom House, Freedom House Country Ratings: Annual Survey of Freedom, Country Scores 1972-73 to 1999-2000: Iraq, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/iceland.
htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
48. Amnesty Int’l, Iraq: Human Rights Committee Brieªng, AI Index MDE 14/08/97, at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde140081997 (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) (referring to violations over the past decade).
49. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq 1355–65
(1989); Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1989: Iraq, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1989/WR89/Iraq.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
50. Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special Rapporteurs and Representatives,
U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 100, at 12–22, U.N. Doc A/49/651 (1994).
51. See Federation of American Scientists, Military Analysis Network, Congo Civil War,
at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/congo.htm (last updated Dec. 21, 1999); Human Rights
Watch, Human Rights World Report 1999, available at http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/ (last
visited Nov. 8, 2003).
52. See Blaine Harden, Diamond Wars: A Special Report, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 2000, at A1 (noting that
“Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda have sent soldiers to assist rebels” in Congo); Robert Graham, Chirac
Meets Mugabe in Bid to End Congo War, Fin. Times, Mar. 7, 2001, at 12 (noting that troops from Rwanda
and Uganda, among others, have occupied “chunks of Congo”); Victor Mallet & Michela Wrong, Call for
Congo Cease Fire After Neighbors Intervene, Fin. Times, Aug. 24, 1998, at 14 (noting that “Angolan forces
had seized the key western airbase of Kitona”).
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Each of the states that intervened aggressively in Congo during the period
of hostilities has engaged in the serious and systematic repression of its own
population, violating fundamental human rights in the process. Angola
ranked a 6,6 “not free” in the Freedom House studies from 1998 to 2000.53
During the period, widespread violations of fundamental rights by government forces, including rape and forced detention, were common.54 From
1998 to 2000, Burundi’s Freedom House ratings ranged from a 7,7 to a
6,6—indicating a “not free” state.55 During 1998-1999, Human Rights Watch
observed that “army and police violated the rights of citizens virtually unchecked” and the government had moved “hundreds of thousands [into]
‘regroupment’ camps.”56 Similarly, Rwanda was ranked a 7,6 “not free”
during the period,57 while HRW found that ªghting between the government and insurgents led to “killing thousands—probably tens of thousands—of unarmed civilians during 1998.”58 Uganda fared slightly better in
Freedom House’s ratings, receiving a 5,5 “partially free” in 1999-2000.59
Nonetheless, HRW found that “restrictions on political activity prevented
those opposed to the government’s policies from organizing and canvassing
for support to bring change through electoral action” and that “the Ugandan
army was also responsible for serious abuses against civilians.”60 The State
Department Human Rights Report on Uganda for 1999 rated the state

53. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003: Country Reports: Angola, at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings/angola.htm (last visited Jan. 5,
2004).
54. The U.S. Department of State Country Report for Angola in 1999 described its human rights record as “poor” and characterized by “numerous serious abuses” including “extrajudicial killing” and widespread attacks on civilians.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1999: Angola, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/223.htm (last visited Nov. 22,
2003); see also Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1999: Angola, at
http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/africa/angola.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
55. Freedom House, Freedom House Country Ratings: Annual Survey of Freedom, Country Scores 1972-73 to 1999-2000: Burundi, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/bolivia.
htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
56. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1999: Burundi, at http://
www.hrw.org/worldreport99/africa/burundi.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2003). In 1997 Amnesty International found that Burundi carried out “political executions after grossly unfair trials.” Amnesty Int’l,
Burundi: Government Carries Out Political Executions After Grossly Unfair Trials, Aug. 1, 1997, AI INDEX:
AFR 16/28/97, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr160281997 (last visited Nov. 8,
2003); see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1999: Burundi, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/230.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003) (describing
Burundi’s human rights record as “poor” and noting numerous cases of “disappearances” and “torture”).
57. Freedom House, Freedom House Country Ratings: Annual Survey of Freedom, Country Scores 1972-73 to 1999-2000: Rwanda, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/phil.
htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
58. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights World Report 1999: Rwanda, at http://www.hrw.
org/worldreport99/africa/rwanda.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
59. Freedom House, Freedom House Country Ratings: Annual Survey of Freedom, Country Scores 1972-73 to 1999-2000: Uganda, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/turk.
htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
60. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights World Report 1999: Uganda, at http://www.hrw.
org/worldreport99/africa/uganda.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).

260

Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 17

“poor.”61 In short, each of the three international aggressor states in the
Congo conºict systematically denied the basic human rights of their own
citizens.
The third major act of international aggression during the period was the
1999 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. After a long period of tension along
the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, in February 1999 troops from both countries
entered into active hostility.62 On February 27, 1999, the U.N. Security
Council condemned the violence and demanded an immediate halt to the
war.63 Throughout 1999, signiªcant ªghting on the border continued with
tens of thousands of casualties reported.64 Again, this is not a conºict in which
an aggressor state can easily be identiªed. During the period of ªghting each
state engaged in arguably aggressive conduct violating the territorial integrity of its neighbor. For our purposes both states will be treated as international aggressors.
During the period of conºict, both Ethiopia and Eritrea had appalling human rights records. From 1999-2000 Freedom House rated Ethiopia a 5,5,
“partially free.”65 “Wide-scale human rights violations” were reported in Ethiopia in 1999, including the deportation or displacement of 400,000 civilians
and the detention of at least 10,000 individuals for “political” crimes.66
NGOs condemned Ethiopia for torture and extrajudicial executions.67 The
U.S. State Department Human Rights Report for Ethiopia in 1999 rated
the country’s record as “poor.”68 Eritrea likewise had an extraordinarily poor
human rights record during the period. Freedom House rated it a 7,5—“not
free.”69 The U.S. State Department criticized Eritrea’s “serious problems.”70
The State Department noted examples of “arbitrary arrest and detention,”
61. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1999: Uguanda, at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/277.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
62. See Ian Fisher, New Fighting Along Border of Ethiopia and Eritrea, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1999, at A4.
63. See Paul Lewis, End Fighting, U.N. Council Tells Ethiopia and Eritrea, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1999, at
A6.
64. See Ethiopia-Eritrea War Heats Up, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1999, at A4; Federation of American
Scientists, Military Analysis Network, Ethiopia/Eritrea War, at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/
ops/war/eritrea.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
65. Freedom House, Freedom House Country Ratings: Annual Survey of Freedom, Country Scores 1972-73 to 1999-2000: Ethiopia, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/
ethiop.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
66. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights World Report 1999: Ethiopia, at http://www.hrw.
org/worldreport99/africa/ethiopia.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
67. See Amnesty International, Report 2001: Ethiopia (2001), at http://web.amnesty.org/web/
ar2001.nsf/webafrcountries/ETHIOPIA (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
68. The report criticizes the government for extrajudicial killings, detention of the press, and severe
limitations on the rights to assembly and association. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices—1999: Ethiopia, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/246.htm
(last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
69. Freedom House, Freedom House Country Ratings: Annual Survey of Freedom, Country Scores 1972-73 to 1999-2000: Eritrea, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/congo.
htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
70. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2000: Eritrea, at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/782.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
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and government control of the media.71 Various NGOs found that numerous
civilians were “jailed without charges” and “the small independent press was
closed” during the 1999–2000 period.72 Evidence suggests that both Ethiopia and Eritrea systematically abused the human rights of their own citizens
during the period of aggressive war.
The fourth signiªcant interstate conºict of the post–Cold War period was
the 1999 war in Kosovo followed by the U.S.-led intervention. There are
two elements to this conºict—ªrst the war waged by Milosevic against
Kosovo and, second, the NATO intervention. Though Kosovo was not an
independent state, its autonomous status73 was such that Milosevic’s military campaign can be interpreted as aggression.74 Such an aggressive war
undertaken by Yugoslav forces against Kosovo, even if only quasi-interstate,
is fully consistent with this thesis. In 1998-1999, Milosevic’s regime in
Yugoslavia was rated a 6,6—“not free”—by Freedom House.75 The U.S.
Department of State Country Report for Serbia in 1999 describes numerous
cases of “extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, brutal beatings, rape,
arbitrary arrest and detention” as well as a crackdown on the independent
media and limits to the rights of assembly.76 Serbia thus can be viewed as
having engaged in aggressive war and was, at the time, a serious and systematic violator of human rights.
The second element of the conºict in Kosovo was the 1999 U.S.-led intervention. There are two different readings of the intervention. One possibility is that the U.S.- and NATO-led operations in Kosovo were legal acts
of intervention and thus not aggression. Although the NATO member states
did not receive advance authorization from the U.N. Security Council, the
campaign was undertaken with a broad international coalition—NATO—and
received ex-post ratiªcation by the United Nations.77 According to this in-

71. Id.
72. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights World Report 2002: Eritrea, at http://www.hrw.
org/wr2k2/africa4.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
73. For a discussion and documents on Kosovo’s history and autonomy, see generally Marc Weller,
The Crisis in Kosovo, 1989-1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and
the Outbreak of Hostilities (1999).
74. Serbia sent several thousand heavily armed soldiers into Kosovo in 1998 to “wipe out a separatist
rebel movement.” Chris Hedges, New Serb Assault On Albania Rebels, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1998, at A1.
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo describes the 1997–1999 conºict “both as an
armed insurgency and counter-insurgency, and as a war (against civilians) of ethnic cleansing.” Independent Int’l Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report (Oct. 2000), at 2.
75. Freedom House, Freedom House Country Ratings: Annual Survey of Freedom, Country Scores 1972-73 to 1999-2000: Yugoslavia, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/
turk.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
76. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1999: SerbiaMontenegro, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/358.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
77. For evidence of the broad international coalition involved in the attacks, see Statement by the
North Atlantic Council on Kosovo (Jan. 30, 1999), at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm
(last visited Jan. 5, 2004) (authorizing air operations in the region). For evidence of ex-post ratiªcation,
see S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 43 (“welcoming” the “political solution to the Kosovo Crisis” deploying
U.N. forces in Kosovo, and requesting the appointment of a Special Representative for Kosovo).
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terpretation,78 the intervention in Kosovo was not an act of aggression and
thus falls outside of the scope of this study.
A second reading of the U.S.-led intervention in Kosovo is that it constituted an illegal act of aggression, not initially sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII.79 Nonetheless, the intervention is consistent
with the basic hypotheses above because it was undertaken by human rights
respecting states against an abusing state in part to protect the population
thereof. NATO coalition members which took action in Kosovo were human
rights respecting states and deemed “free states” by Freedom House at the
time of the conºict.80 As indicated above, the human rights record of Yugoslavia at the time was appalling. The Independent International Commission
on Kosovo found that between February 1998 and March 1999 “more than
400,000 people were driven from their homes during this period, about half
of these were internally displaced.”81 Between March and June 1999, the
Commission found the number of killings in the neighborhood of 10,000,
with the vast majority of the victims being Kosovar Albanians killed by
FRY forces.82
Moreover, the primary justiªcation for the military action advanced by
NATO was the protection of the human rights of the Kosovar people. The
North Atlantic Council’s January 30, 1999 statement authorizing NATO’s
use of force in Kosovo speaks of “averting a humanitarian catastrophe” and
the “preservation of the rights of all ethic groups.”83 When President Clinton
announced the initiation of military actions against Serbia he justiªed it in
terms of “stop[ping] the brutal repression in Kosovo.”84 Similarly, soon after
the initiation of the air campaign, British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated
that “horriªc repression by Serb forces in Kosovo is only emerging now” as a
reason for the attacks.85
The ªnal act of aggression in the post–Cold War period is the March
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Once again, this attack has two possible read78. For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see Alain Pallet, Brief Remarks on the Unilateral
Use of Force, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 385 (2000) (noting that “arguments based both on the U.N. Charter and
on the law of state responsibility can be made in [favour of the legality of the intervention] and indeed
become persuasive when seen together with, and in light of, Resolution 1244”).
79. This is the approach taken by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, which found
that “the NATO military intervention was illegal . . . because it did not receive prior approval from the
United Nations Security Council.” Independent Int’l Commission on Kosovo, supra note 74, at 4.
80. See generally Freedom House, Freedom House Country Ratings: Annual Survey of Freedom, Country Scores 1972-73 to 1999-2000, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/
freeworld/2001/methodology.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
81. Independent Int’l Commission on Kosovo, supra note 74, at 2.
82. Id.
83. See Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo, supra note 77.
84. Conºict in the Balkans: Clinton’s Announcement of the Attack, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1999, at A15.
85. Prime Minister Tony Blair, Statement to Parliament on the NATO Summit in Washington (Apr.
26, 1999), at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1300.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2004). In addition,
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo found that, though illegal, the intervention was
“legitimate” because it “had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period
of oppression under Serbian rule.” Independent Int’l Commission on Kosovo, supra note 74.
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ings, both consistent with this thesis. One reading of the conºict is that it
was legal and not an act of aggression. According to such a reading, advanced by, among others, British Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, Security Council Resolutions 678 and 1441 collectively provided authorization
for the use of force.86 This approach implies that the war is not an illegal act
of aggression and thus should be excluded from the data sets used in this
study.
A second reading of the war is that, lacking a U.N. mandate, the 2003
invasion of Iraq was illegal and constituted an international act of aggression.87 Again, the war in Iraq can be consistent with the basic hypotheses if
it was undertaken by human rights respecting states against a human rights
abusing state and, at least partially, justiªed on that ground. At the time of
the war, the United States and its main coalition partner, the United Kingdom, should both be classiªed as human rights respecting states, notwithstanding some criticism of U.S. human rights practices after September
11.88 In 2002-03 Iraq remained a serious and systematic violator of human
rights. Its 2002 Freedom House score was still a 7,7 “not free.”89 The 2002
U.S. State Department Country Report described Iraq’s human rights record
as “extremely poor,” and noted that Iraq “continued to commit numerous,
serious human rights abuses” including “numerous political and other extrajudicial killings.”90 Similarly, freedoms of the press, association, and assembly were severely limited.91 In the wake of the conºict in Iraq numerous
reports of mass graves, systematic torture, and extra-judicial killings have
emerged.92
The protection of the human rights of the Iraqi people was also a
signiªcant—though not primary—justiªcation for the conºict. Clearly, an
overriding justiªcation for intervention advanced by the United States was
the alleged development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by
Saddam’s regime. That said, the United States and its coalition partners often cited human rights violations in Iraq as an additional reason for the war.
In September 2002 Prime Minister Tony Blair declared, “we want the
86. Lord Goldsmith, Lord Goldsmith‘s Statement, Times (London), Mar. 18, 2003, at 2.
87. For a discussion of this argument presented alongside other views, see Peter Ford, As Attack on
Iraq Begins, Question Remains: Is It Legal?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 21, 2003, at 5.
88. Despite some criticisms of U.S. human rights practices, particularly with respect to the ongoing
detentions in Guantanamo Bay, both the U.S. Bill of Rights (applicable to the U.S.) and the European
Convention on Human Rights (applicable to the UK) ensure the basic human and civil liberties sufªcient
to guard the basic rights of human agency. See U.S. Const. amend. I-X; European Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
89. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2002: country reports: Iraq, at http://www. freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/countryratings/iraq.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
90. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2002: Iraq, at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18277.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Patrick E. Tyler, Aftereffects: War Crimes; Mass Grave In Iraq May Hold Kuwaitis Missing
Since 1991, N.Y. Times, May 17, 2003, at A1.

264

Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 17

[Iraqi] people to live fulªlling lives without the oppression and terror of
Saddam.”93 In his 2003 State of the Union address President Bush claimed
that “[t]he dictator who is assembling the world‘s most dangerous weapons
has already used them on whole villages.”94 Speaking to the U.N. Security
Council on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell described
“Saddam Hussein‘s violations of human rights” as a “subject of deep and
continuing concern to this Council.”95 Reading the war in Iraq as an act of
aggression by the United States and its partners is fully consistent with the
argument of this Article because the war was waged in part to protect the
human rights of civilians in an abusive state and was, to some degree,
justiªed on those grounds.
Admittedly, this interpretation of the Iraq war is open to controversy and
it is a hard case. Some may suggest an exclusive U.S. interest in oil and that
the human rights justiªcations were but instrumental rhetoric. That does
not, however, undermine the basic claim. Rather, the logic here suggests
that, but for Iraq’s human rights record, the United States would not and
could not have undertaken the war as there would have been insufªcient
domestic support and even less international consensus. The fact that Bush
and Blair included human rights rhetoric in their justiªcations for war indicates the importance of highlighting Iraq’s human rights abuses in order to
win popular acceptance of the war. Furthermore, the limits of that popular
acceptance, where human rights violations are not part of the calculation, are
a key element of human rights-aggression linkage.
These brief case studies suggest a strong correlation between serious and
systematic human rights abuses at home and interstate aggression. Signiªcantly,
there were no interstate wars in the post–Cold War period launched by human
rights respecting states against other human rights respecting states. Each of
the interstate aggressive wars in the period was either initiated by a state
that systematically violated its own citizens’ basic human rights or was undertaken by a human rights respecting state at least in part to protect the
human rights of citizens in an abusive state.
III. The Causes of the Human Rights Peace
There are strong theoretical arguments behind the apparent correlation
between domestic human rights policy and international aggression beyond
actual evidence from case studies. Two such pathways for human rights peace
93. Prime Minister Tony Blair, Annual Address to the TUC (Sept. 10, 2002), quoted in Foreign and
Commonwealth Ofªce, Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses 2 (2002), available
at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/KFile/hrdossier.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
94. President George W. Bush, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 39 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 115 (Jan. 28, 2003).
95. Secretary Colin L. Powell, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2004). In calling on the Security
Council to act, Powell referenced Saddam’s use of “nerve gas against the Kurds” and on-going campaigns
of “ethnic cleansing.” Id.
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draw on democratic peace literature, but do not rely on the role of free elections in constraining democratic government. First, a structural argument
points to the constraints imposed by the institutionalization of human rights
protection. Second, a political and social beliefs argument posits that the
shared values and beliefs in the primacy of human rights impose limits on
human rights respecting states but fail to impose such limits on human
rights violating states.96
A. Human Rights and Institutional Constraints
One causal pathway rooted in liberal international relations theory that
may explain the observed correlation between systematic human rights violations and interstate aggression is the institutional constraint that accompanies human rights protections.97 Institutionalization of human rights
norms has at least two powerful effects on state behavior. First, human rights
protections govern how broad a spectrum of the community has at least
some voice in the political decisions of the state. Even if the state is not a
democratic polyarchy, if it provides basic protections for the human rights of
all or most citizens, then a very broad spectrum of the polity is represented
in political affairs. Freedom of thought and freedom from extrajudicial bodily harm, for example, allow citizens to develop their own views on political
issues and, often, to express those views through public channels. A wider
spectrum of voices, in turn, increases the level of political competition—one
of the key structural explanations for the democratic peace—even without
the establishment of a democratic form of government.98 Of course, in a
non-democratic, but human rights respecting state, the views of individual
interests may not have a direct effect on state policy, but, arguably, they can
still increase the level of political competition by facilitating debate and the
exchange of ideas.
The second effect of institutionalized protections of human rights is to set
a minimum ºoor of treatment for all citizens within the domestic polity.
Even in a non-democracy, minimum human rights protections ensure that
96. Both potential causal pathways draw heavily on liberal political science theory. For detailed
speciªcations of this theory, see Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 Int’l. Org. 513, 515 (1997). See also Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace 211
(1997). Liberal theory provides a way of understanding state behavior that renders the state transparent
and yields explanations of state behavior based on domestic interactions within the national polity and
their ability to affect government policy. In the liberal model, basic human rights protections directly
affect the ability of citizens to inºuence their own government, and such protections are indicative of the
relationship between the national government and its citizens.
97. Variants of the democratic peace hypothesis rely on institutional constraint logic and claim that
the “democratic political structure imposes constraints on the decision-making processes by restricting
key decision makers’ freedom of choice.” Morgan & Campbell, supra note 28, at 189–90. As applied to
the human rights argument presented here, the claim is not that democracy imposes constraints, but
rather that institutionalized respect for human rights limits the freedom of leaders of human rights respecting states.
98. See Morgan & Campbell, supra note 28, at 191 (observing that “the nature of political competition
in a state should affect the level to which the leader’s decision making capability is constrained”).
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rights are accorded to individuals not directly represented by the government. By ensuring a minimum treatment of the unrepresented, human rights
protections prevent the government from externalizing the costs of aggressive behavior on the unrepresented. In human rights respecting states, for
example, unrepresented individuals cannot be forced at gunpoint to ªght or
be bound into slavery to generate low-cost economic resources for war, and
thus restrain the state from engaging in aggressive action. On the other
hand, in a state where power is narrowly concentrated in the hands of a political elite that systematically represses its own people, the state will be
more able to bear the domestic costs of war. By violating the human rights
of its own citizens, a state can force individuals to ªght or support the military apparatus in its war-making activities. Similarly, by denying basic human rights, a state may be better able to bear the political costs of war. Even
if such a state had fair elections, denial of freedom of thought and expression
might well insulate the government from the electoral costs of an aggressive
foreign policy.99
B. Shared Human Rights Beliefs and Values
The social beliefs explanation begins from the proposition that individuals within human rights protecting states share a preference for a minimum
set of protections of human rights. This assumption is appropriate for two
reasons. First, according to liberal political science theory, state policy represents the preferences of some subset of the domestic polity.100 If the observed
state policy is to protect human rights, then at least some subset of the domestic polity must share that preference. Second, even if individuals within
a domestic polity seek a variety of differentiated ends, basic respect for human rights allows individuals to pursue—to some degree at least—those
ends as they deªne them. Liberal theory thus suggests that individuals within a
human rights respecting state tend to support basic human rights provisions.
The next step in the social beliefs argument is to recognize that respect
for human rights has an inherently universalist tendency.101 Unlike cultural
or national rights, human rights are just that—human. They apply as much
99. With respect to the democratic peace hypothesis, Morgan and Campbell argue that “leaders who
have to stand for popular election should be expected to take public attitudes into account when making
decisions” and are thus subject to greater constraints. Morgan & Campbell, supra note 28, at 190. If even
such elected leaders systematically deny their own population basic human rights, however, they might
well be free from the supposed constraints of democratic governance.
100. According to liberal theory, governments “represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis
of whose interests state ofªcials deªne state preferences and act purposefully in world politics.” Moravcsik, supra note 96, at 518. In the liberal model, then, the state is not an independent actor, but rather a
representative institution that serves as a “transmission belt by which the preferences and social power of
individuals and groups in civil society enter the political realm and are eventually translated into state
policy.” Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientiªc Assessment, in Progress in
International Relations Theory 3 (Colin Elman & Mirian Fendius Elman eds., 2002).
101. See, e.g., Ignatieff, supra note 34, at 56–57.
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to those individuals within a domestic polity as to those outside the polity.
Such cosmopolitan liberalism indicates that “the more people are free, the
better off all are.”102 The net result is that individuals within a human rights
respecting state tend, on the average, to support the human rights of individuals in other states as well.
Given a set of universalist human rights values in states that respect human rights, the policy articulated by the government may be one which respects human rights at home and demands their protection abroad. This belief
in a thin set of universal human rights may cause the leadership of the state
to frame its security policy around that belief structure and to refrain from
aggressive acts that would violate the human rights of citizens at home or
abroad. As Peter Katzenstein argues, “security interests are deªned by actors
who respond to cultural factors.”103 Acts of international aggression tend to
impinge on the human rights of individuals in the target state and, at least
temporarily, limit their freedom. After all, bombs, bullets, death and destruction are not consistent with respect for basic human rights.104 Framed
in the liberal international relations theory terms of policy interdependence,
international aggression by State A imposes costs on State B, whose citizens’
human rights will be infringed upon by the act of aggression. This infringement in turn imposes costs on citizens in State A, whose citizens have
a preference for the protection of the human rights of citizens in both states.
This shared value of respect for human rights thus may restrain State A from
pursuing international aggression.105
By contrast, a state which commits gross human rights violations against
its own people will not be subject to this restraint. Such violations often
occur when the government has been “captured” by a select minority that
chooses to violate human rights. If the citizens themselves are not in favor of
human rights at home, they are unlikely to be committed to the enforcement of human rights abroad. Where capture occurs, the government is not
responsive to the preferences of the domestic polity. In such cases, even if
there is a strong preference among citizens to protect human rights at home
and abroad, the government is unlikely to respond to those interests and its
policies will not be constrained by them.

102. Owen, supra note 28, at 94. As John Owen has argued with respect to the democratic peace, “although beliefs and cultures may differ, liberalism says, all persons share a fundamental interest in selfpreservation and material well-being.” Id. at 93–94.
103. Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security, in The Culture of
National Security 1, 2 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996).
104. This social beliefs proposition further suggests that citizens in human rights respecting states
“develop norms and expectations regarding proper methods of conºict resolution” that include respect for
human rights. See generally Morgan & Campbell, supra note 28.
105. An important factor in such a cost-beneªt analysis will be the rhetorical strategies chosen by
various actors. Different strategies might accentuate or negate this phenomenon. This argument is similar to the normative value of “liberalism” that Owen sees as the deªnitive cause of the democratic peace.
See generally Owen, supra note 28.
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A signiªcant corollary to this normative argument may explain why human rights respecting states may nonetheless engage in acts of international
aggression against human rights violating states. When human rights respecting states intervene in human rights abusing states, leaders within the
respecting state might deem themselves to be securing the human rights of
the individuals in the violating state through the act of aggression. Thus,
the shared normative value would cease to act as a restraint on interstate
aggression and might well be a cause of aggression, particularly when other
factors such as economic or security issues place such aggressive intervention
high on the priority list of interests within the human rights respecting
state.106 This desire of human rights respecting states to free citizens in a
human rights violating state may well explain cases of apparently aggressive
aggression by human rights respecting states, such as the U.S.-led war against
Iraq in 2003.
IV. Alterations to U.S. Foreign Policy Informed by Human Rights
Given the linkage between a state’s domestic human rights record and its
propensity to engage in international aggression, U.S. national security could be
enhanced by a greater emphasis on the promotion of human rights in U.S.
foreign policy. In short, better human rights practices around the globe
make the United States safer and more secure. The human rights informed
foreign policy presented here is intended to supplement and alter—not replace—traditional foreign policy. Such a policy would not neglect national
security concerns, but rather would understand the promotion of national
security and human rights to be related and mutually reinforcing goals. The
linkage between human rights and international aggression offers a new means
of predicting, preventing, and addressing potential aggressor states. Further,
it suggests alternative mechanisms for dealing with pressing threats such as
terrorism and WMD. Finally, it offers a new opportunity for renewed U.S.
engagement with the U.N. in protecting international peace and security.
A. Human Rights Violations as a Predictor of Interstate Aggression
The ªrst important role for human rights in such a new foreign policy is
that of viewing human rights violations as a predictor of interstate aggression. If states that systematically violate their own citizens’ human rights are
more likely to engage in international aggression, a state’s human rights
record can indicate that state’s propensity to endanger international stability,
peace, and security. Admittedly, not every state with a poor human rights

106. Likewise, such actions by human rights respecting states against human rights violating states
are far more likely when the costs and human rights violations of war can be minimized through the use
of modern technology and speciªc targeting of those responsible for the violations. See generally Michael
Ignatieff, Virtual War (2000).
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record will become an interstate aggressor.107 Other more traditional factors
such as a state’s military capability or the preferences of its political elites
still matter. A state’s human rights record nonetheless appears to serve as a
good proxy for its aggressive potential. Thus, a poor human rights record
should give pause for concern, not just on traditional grounds that individuals in that state are oppressed,108 but also because that state may be more
likely to engage in aggressive conduct.
Using human rights as a predictor of international aggression changes some
of the countries the United States has identiªed as most threatening to international stability and/or U.S. security. In the past, U.S. policymakers have
identiªed rogue states based on a number of factors including their military
capabilities, their government’s ideological stance, and their willingness to
support the U.S. agenda. A state’s human rights record should be an important part of that calculation. States with poor human rights records ought to
be of greater concern because of the aggressive threat they may pose. Some
states with negative human rights records, such as Iran or North Korea, are
already termed rogue states for other reasons. Their human rights records
suggest that they should be of even greater concern to the United States.
Other states with troubling human rights records, such as Belarus, Zimbabwe or Sudan, have not traditionally been of signiªcant U.S. policy interest. They should be. Even if they lack the capabilities to directly threaten
the United States, their human rights records suggest they are prime candidates to engage in regional aggression that could well have destabilizing consequences, threaten international peace and security, and require U.S. action
after the fact.109 Finally, other countries presently of concern to the United
States with fair or good human rights records may be less troubling because
their human rights records suggest they are constrained by norms and institutions that make them unlikely to be aggressive.110
A human rights informed foreign policy would still recognize the particular dangers presented by the proliferation and use of WMD. Obviously,
however, the acquisition of WMD by different types of states presents very
107. Some states with particularly poor human rights practices may never pose aggressive threats. For
example, Algeria generally lacks the military capability to pose an aggressive interstate threat. Similarly,
Saudi Arabia, despite great military capability, probably lacks the governmental resolve to do so. To draw
a complete picture of potential aggressors these other factors must also be considered.
108. See, e.g., National Security Strategy, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that “in the twenty-ªrst century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political
and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity”).
109. For a discussion of the human rights records of these countries, see, for example, U.S. Dep’t of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2002: Zimbabwe, at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18234.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003);
U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2002: Sudan, at http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18228.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
110. This is not to say such states should be neglected. There may be good reasons for them to be a
focus of U.S. policy, independent of their aggressive potential. Possible reasons could include involvement in the drug trade or immigration issues.
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different levels of threat to the United States and the global community. As
such, differentiation between acquisition of WMD by threatening and nonthreatening states is necessary. A state’s human rights record and practices
provide powerful tools for such differentiation. If Sweden, for example, were
to develop a nuclear capability, it would pose little threat to the United
States or to global stability.111 If, on the other hand, North Korea or Iran
further develop such a capability, the threat would increase exponentially.
States that systematically abuse human rights at home have already shown
their willingness to use force against civilians and to take life indiscriminately. Moreover, they have a greater propensity to engage in aggressive war
which might lead to the use of such weapons. When states that systematically violate human rights domestically acquire WMD they gain the ability
to threaten a far wider region and even U.S. national security directly.112
The correlation between human rights abuse and international aggression
suggests that the United States must take particularly strong measures to
prevent human rights abusing states from acquiring WMD. Based on a
similar logic, Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter have recently argued
that there is an international legal “duty to prevent nations run by absolute
leaders without internal checks on their power from acquiring or using
WMD.”113 They suggest a menu of options to prevent such proliferation,
including “diplomatic pressure or incentives, economic sanctions or inducements, or coercive action, often in combination.”114
These policy alterations are open to at least two signiªcant criticisms. First,
some may argue that human rights abuses are not conclusive of an aggressive
threat. They are correct. Alone, human rights records cannot tell with any
certainty whether a state will engage in aggression. Including human rights
practices in an overall assessment of a state’s behavior, however, provides a
far better indicator of that state’s aggressive potential than merely looking at
its military capabilities or political rhetoric. Second, some may claim that
this expanded human rights policy will turn the United States into a global
human rights police force, wasting important diplomatic capital. This policy does not obligate the United States to pursue human rights improvements in all countries at all times. Rather, U.S. policymakers will still need
to determine selectively when additional human rights pressure would be
effective and necessary.

111. For a realist discussion of the role of threat and threat perception in national security, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances 17–28 (1987).
112. See Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Duty to Prevent, Foreign Aff., January-February
2004, at 136 (noting the particular danger posed by “a relatively small group of clearly identiªable [human rights abusing] leaders who are not simply dictators, but also mass murderers. They are known to be
dangerous to their own people and their possession of weapons of mass destruction makes them an even
greater danger.”).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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B. Preventing International Aggression Through Human Rights Policy
In dealing with states of concern, improving a given state’s human rights
policy is almost never a primary goal of U.S. policy. A human rights informed
foreign policy would include far more active advocacy for improvement in
some states’ human rights records. Such policies should be advocated not
just for the traditional human rights reasons of life and human dignity,115
but also because improved human rights records may enhance national and
global security by preventing states from engaging in international aggression in the future. Even for skeptics of the universal duty to promote human
rights on grounds of individual dignity, this second argument should have
persuasive weight in asserting the strategic importance of human rights in
U.S. foreign policy.
This argument would push the United States toward a far more active advocacy of human rights improvement in its bilateral relations with numerous countries. Rather than merely paying rhetorical dues to human rights,
such a foreign policy would make clear to abusing states that human rights
are a strategic priority of the U.S. government. It might involve linking
foreign aid, trade ties, and other beneªts to improvements in human rights
records.116 In extreme cases such a policy might even suggest military intervention through U.N. mechanisms. Two brief examples—China and North
Korea—are illustrative. The U.S. dialogue with China has long included human rights issues, but also made clear that human rights would not stand in
the way of a mutually beneªcial economic relationship.117 Though other
factors such as economics should still be considered, human rights should be
higher on the bilateral agenda, and the United States might be well served
to use trade and other leverage points more vigorously in pursuing that goal.
United States policy toward North Korea presently focuses almost exclusively on nuclear and ballistic missile issues. While these issues are important, North Korea might be far less likely to use these technologies if its
human rights policies improved signiªcantly. Human rights improvement,
therefore, should be higher on the agenda and an integral part of any future
agreements with the North Korean government.
Again, some critics may argue that the United States will waste important
diplomatic capital in the pursuit of human rights. The point here is that there
are good reasons—beyond ideology and based on national security—to pur115. Such justiªcations tend to be based on the innate worth of the individual as developed in the liberal political philosophy of writers such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill. See, e.g., John Locke, Two
Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); John Stuart
Mill, On Liberty 73–85 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
116. President Bush’s Millennium Challenge Fund takes a step in this direction by linking aid to domestic policy changes. Bush’s proposal, however, is more concerned with democratization and market
economics than with human rights policy. See The White House, Millennium Challenge Account, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations/millennium.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2004).
117. Clinton’s continued renewal of China’s most favored nation status is indicative. See Sanger, supra
note 20.
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sue human rights such that diplomatic capital will not be wasted. Nonetheless, as the Russia-Chechnya case study below illustrates, the United States
will still need to balance a range of factors in formulating national security
and may, at times, deem it necessary to put human rights lower on the agenda.
The human rights-aggression linkage, however, provides an additional factor
that augurs for greater attention to human rights in U.S. foreign policy.
C. Addressing Aggressor States: Human Rights and Interstate Signaling
A foreign policy which accounts for the linkage between human rights and
interstate aggression would view a state’s human rights record as a potential
signaling device for its international intentions. Traditionally, it is very difªcult for a state to send a signal to other states that it does not have aggressive international intentions. Asymmetric information in any international
negotiation presents a signiªcant challenge. One side rarely fully understands
the interests and intent of the other.118 Signaling offers a means by which
states can overcome the problems of incomplete information by revealing
their intentions to others. The difªculty with signaling, however, is that
states often send misleading signals or they are misinterpreted by their audiences.119 For signaling to be effective it is necessary to identify a clear indicator that can not easily be manipulated by the sending state or misinterpreted
by the receiving state. Lasting institutionalized changes in human rights
policy can provide such a signaling mechanism.
Signiªcant improvements in a previously repressive state’s human rights
policy can signal an intent not to engage in international aggression. For such a
signal to be credible the state must clearly do more than release a few political prisoners or offer pro-human rights rhetoric. But institutionalized changes
in human rights policies—such as new legislation or constitutional amendments that are actually practiced, genuine limits on police and military
power over citizens, or the independence of the judiciary to review the executive’s human rights policies—offer credible signals that the state is less
likely to engage in international aggression.120 States of concern can utilize
the linkage between human rights and international aggression as a means
to send unambiguous signals of the lack of aggressive intent through institutionalized improvements in human rights practices. A foreign policy in-

118. Kenneth A. Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises, 92 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 829, 829 (1998) (observing that “the primary danger associated with asymmetric information is
that actors uncertain about their rivals’ preferences will mistakenly take action that bring about an unwanted war”).
119. See id. (noting that “[s]ince each state expects its rival to engage in strategic misrepresentation
. . . sending credible signals of resolve” is thus difªcult). See also James D. Morrow, Signaling Difªculties
with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining, 36 Int’l Stud. Q. 153 (1992).
120. See, e.g., Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign
Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 1, 27 (2001) (noting “that the rule of law and an
effective independent judiciary are crucial elements [of human rights protection in] any functioning
democracy”).
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formed by human rights would closely monitor human rights developments
so as to properly read such signals and potentially improve relations with
states that institutionalize human rights protections.
The institutionalization of human rights protections is not only a means
of signaling benign intent, but is also inversely correlated with a state’s ability
to engage in aggressive conduct. As a state embeds human rights protections
in its domestic system—even without democratization—a number of structural changes occur within the society that limit aggressive potential. First,
as Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink have argued, a culture of human
rights may develop within the population and become institutionalized domestically.121 Such a human rights culture would reject international aggression as a threat to the human rights of citizens in other states. Second, institutionalization of human rights protections expands the ability of citizens to
voice opposition to aggressive state policy through freedoms of belief,
speech, and assembly. Third, institutionalization erodes the ability of the
state to coerce its citizens into providing the resources and human capital
necessary for aggressive war.122
A brief example is illustrative of the use of human rights policy as a signaling device. Iran is currently a state of considerable concern to U.S. foreign policy because of alleged WMD programs and links to terrorists.123
Obviously, it is difªcult for Iran to show that it does not seek WMD or links
with terrorist organizations. One powerful means for Iran to escape its current categorization as a member of the “axis of evil” is to signal benign international intent through institutionalization of human rights protections.
If Iran, for example, were to greatly expand its de jure and de facto freedoms
of speech, assembly, and belief, the United States should read that as a signal
of potentially benign international intent and seek to improve bilateral relations. This is not to say that WMD and terrorism should be ignored, but
where allegations are hard to prove and impossible to falsify, human rights
policy offers a good proxy of a state’s international intentions and should be
responded to as such. If, on the other hand, signiªcant denigration of human
rights policy, such as the January 2004 disqualiªcation of nearly half the
parliamentary candidates by the Guardian Council, were to continue in Iran,

121. See, e.g., Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms
Into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and
Domestic Change 1, 3 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999) (observing that “international human rights
regimes and the principles, norms, and rules embedded in them are internalized and implemented domestically”).
122. This is not to imply that human rights respecting states cannot and will not engage in international conºict, but rather that conºict will either be “legal”—sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council or
constituting self defense—or will be undertaken to protect the human rights of citizens in abusive states.
123. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union, 38 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 135 (Jan. 29, 2002) (declaring that “Iran aggressively pursues
these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people‘s hope for freedom”).
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that would signal a greater likelihood of international aggression and provide sound reason for a ªrmer U.S. policy.124
The institutionalization of human rights protections also provides a way
for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive
international behavior. By locking in human rights protections now through
constitutional changes or judicial review, a present government can limit the
hand of future governments, denying them the institutional or political
ability to engage in aggressive war or impinge on human rights.125
D. Human Rights and a New U.S.-U.N. Engagement
After the March 2003 failure to secure a new U.N. resolution authorizing
the use of force in Iraq, many politicians and commentators claimed the
U.N. was quickly becoming irrelevant. As Richard Perle put it: Saddam
Hussein “will take the U.N. down with him.”126 Yet, at this time, the United
States needs the U.N. more than ever to help transition to Iraqi rule. One
potential means of rapprochement between the United States and the U.N.
is to prioritize human rights issues through U.N. institutions. Just as human rights are separated from core issues of U.S. national security, so too are
human rights issues rarely discussed in the U.N. Security Council.127 They
are instead handled largely by the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the
relatively powerless Third Committee, which is tasked with humanitarian
and cultural affairs.128 This has limited the U.N.’s effectiveness in addressing
human rights issues, with the rare exceptions of cross-border conºict or
refugee ºows.
A human rights informed U.S. foreign policy would seek to engage with
the U.N. in addressing human rights abuses and pushing toward a more
mainstream role for human rights in the Security Council. Multilateral efforts at human rights improvement—particularly through the U.N.—are far
more likely to succeed than unilateral pressure from the United States. The
two primary challenges to prioritizing human rights in the U.N. are, ªrst,
political challenges from some Security Council members and, second, the

124. Gareth Smyth, Iran Ballot “Could Include Banned Names,” Fin. Times, Jan. 23, 2004, at 6.
125. For a discussion of this lock-in mechanism in the context of the European Convention on Human
Rights, see Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of International Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in
Postwar Europe, 54 Int’l Org. 217 (2000).
126. Richard Perle, Editorial, Thank God for the Death of the U.N.—Its Abject Failure Gave Us Only Anarchy. The World Needs Order, Guardian (London), Mar. 21, 2003, at 26; see also Michael J. Glennon, Why
The Security Council Failed, Foreign Aff., May-June 2003, at 16, 30 (stating that “In the winter of 2003
th[e] entire ediªce [of the U.N. Charter] came crashing down”).
127. For discussions of the role of human rights considerations in the Security Council, see Richard B.
Lillich, The Role of the U.N. Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: U.N. Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, 3 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1 (1995); Note, International
Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Ramiªcations of Reform on the United Nations’ Security
Council, 31 Tex. Int’l L. J. 107 (1996).
128. See, e.g., U.N. General Assembly Third Committee, at http://www.un.org/ga/57/third/index.
html (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
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Charter requirement that Chapter VII enforcement action be conditioned
upon ªnding of a threat to international peace and security.129 Though political problems in the Security Council will still need to be addressed, the
linkage between human rights abuse and interstate aggression offers a new
means for the Security Council to consider domestic abuse of human rights
as a threat to international peace and security. This, in turn, could allow a
more active use of Chapter VII enforcement tools by the Security Council to
address human rights issues.
E. A Human Rights Foreign Policy in Action: Three Brief Examples
Three brief examples help illustrate how the linkage between human rights
and international aggression would alter U.S. foreign policy. Iran and Liberia
are states of some concern to the United States but have been treated very
differently. Russia is becoming an important partner with the United States
on a number of issues, but is responsible for serious human rights abuse in
Chechnya. The goal of these examples is not to offer a comprehensive foreign
policy toward the three states, but rather to show how a strategic connection
between human rights and national security would modify U.S. policy for
the better.
1. Iran
Iran has long been a foreign policy concern to the United States, primarily
due to its ofªcial anti-U.S. ideology and its apparent desire to acquire
WMD.130 The foreign policy suggested in this article would still regard Iran
as a state of considerable concern to the United States, but would add an
additional reason, namely Iran’s human rights practices. Since the Islamic
Revolution of 1979, Iran has had a very troubling human rights record. Its
Freedom House scores for the period have ranged from a 5,6 to a 6,7, indicating a “not free” state.131 U.S. State Department reports on Iran have consistently described its human rights record as “poor” and noted that it is
responsible for “extrajudicial killings and summary executions.”132 Iran’s

129. See U.N. Charter art. 39 (requiring the “Security Council . . . [to] determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” before taking enforcement action).
130. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, President Discusses Medicare, Iraq, Iran, and the Middle
East, June 18, 2003, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030618-6.html (last visited
Oct. 25, 2003) (noting that “the international community must come together to make it very clear to
Iran that we will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon. Iran would be dangerous if they have
a nuclear weapon. I brought this subject up in the G8; we had a good discussion on the subject, with
near universal agreement that we all must work together to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear
weapon.”).
131. Freedom House, Freedom House Country Ratings: Annual Survey of Freedom,
Country Scores 1972-73 to 1999-2000: Iran, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/
iceland.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
132. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1999: Iran, at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/409.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
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human rights record alone would place it near the top of the U.S. policy
agenda as a potential aggressor state.
The human rights-aggression link suggests alterations in U.S. policy toward Iran. Current policy emphasizes preventing Iran from acquiring WMD,133
which is admittedly important. The danger of WMD in Iranian hands, however, stems in part from the aggressive tendencies associated with Iran’s human rights abuses. A dramatic improvement in Iran’s human rights record
would thus decrease the danger of the state’s potential WMD acquisition.
Part and parcel of U.S. non-proliferation goals, then, should be active advocacy of human rights improvement in Iran. Such a policy would differentiate
reformist groups in government and civil society from conservative religious
leaders. It would single out repressive elements within Iran—those particular clerics who seek to push Iran back toward totalitarian theocracy. Likewise, it would support elements within Iran that seek liberalization, democracy, and human freedom. That might involve beginning a conversation
with President Mohammed Khatami and members of parliament through
our European partners. It might involve changing rhetoric and granting
minor concessions that strengthen Khatami’s hand vis-à-vis the clerical leadership. Such a policy would encourage non-governmental efforts to engage
with and assist Iran’s NGO and academic communities. Finally, such a policy would require Iran’s full participation in the war on terror and an end to
its support for the Hezbollah.
A ªnal alteration to current U.S. policy would involve close monitoring of
Iran to look for signaling of benign international intent through improved
human rights practices. For example, in late May 2003, the religious capital
of Qom, from which the 1977 revolution emanated, hosted the International
Conference on the Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights. Though this
was but a small step, it pointed in the right direction. If institutionalized
changes occur that limit the power of the executive/clerical leadership to
repress basic rights or subject such actions to independent judicial review, it
might be appropriate to reconsider Iran’s labeling as a member of the “Axis
of Evil.” Admittedly, such institutionalization of human rights may take a
different form in Iran, given its historical, religious, and political circumstances, but steps that limit the power of the government over citizens can
still be observed by the United States. Such policy alterations would not
solve all issues of the U.S.-Iran relationship, but they would shift the emphasis of U.S. policy and might prove more effective than the current approach.

133. See, e.g., Ari Fleischer, Press Brieªngs (Feb. 12, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/02/20020212-9.html (commenting that “when the President referred to the axis of evil,
and identiªed North Korea, Iran and Iraq, what the President was referring to is . . . not only their support of terrorism, which is plain—they are on the State Department list of terrorist states—but also their
development of weapons of mass destruction”).
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2. Liberia
In marked contrast with Iran, Liberia has, until recently, been of only very
minor U.S. interest. According to a State Department report, the most notable aspect of U.S. involvement with Liberia before 2003 was that the
United States “donated hundreds of tons of rice.”134 This, of course, changed
in summer 2003 after Bush’s African tour, when the White House demanded a U.N. presence in Liberia and afªrmed that the United States would
“participate with the troops.”135 A human rights-informed foreign policy
would have paid far greater attention to Liberia prior to 2003. In the midst
of a civil war, Liberia has demonstrated a poor human rights record. Over
the past ªve years its Freedom House scores have ranged from a 7,6, “not
free,” to a 4,5, “partially free.” The U.S. Department of State noted in 1999,
for example, that the “government‘s human rights record remained poor,”
that the “security forces committed many extrajudicial killings,” and that
the judiciary “was unable to ensure citizens‘ rights.”136 While Liberia is unlikely to pose a direct threat to the United States, it has been an aggressive
and destabilizing force in the region,137 and American forces have been
needed as part of the effort to restore international peace and security in the
region.138 Had U.S. foreign policy been informed by the human rightsaggression linkage, Liberia would have been considered of far more concern
to the United States years ago. Greater U.S. participation in the process to
end the civil war, more active advocacy for human rights improvements, and
possibly the earlier engagement of U.N. peacekeepers in Liberia might have
prevented the aggressive acts of which President Taylor stands accused.
Looking forward, a human rights informed foreign policy will stress different issues in the growing dialogue with Liberia. Rather than advocate for
early elections to replace Moses Blah,139 such a policy would recognize the
importance of ªrst establishing liberal constitutionalism, which guarantees
basic human rights protections.140 Moreover, the United States would push
134. U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Liberia, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/6618.htm#relations (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
135. President George W. Bush, President Reafªrms Strong Position on Liberia, July 14, 2003, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030714-3.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2004).
136. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1999: Liberia, at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/254.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
137. The indictment of Liberian President Charles Taylor by the Sierra Leone Special Court on charges
of “’bearing the greatest responsibility’ for war crimes . . . crimes against humanity . . . and other . . .
serious violations of international humanitarian law . . . in Sierra Leone” is indicative of this aggressive
threat. Human Rights Watch, West Africa: Taylor Indictment Advances Justice, June 4, 2003, available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/westafrica060403.htm.
138. See U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4803rd mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4803 (2003); S. Res. 1497, 58th
Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1497 (2003) (authorizing a multinational force for Liberia); see also Tim
Weiner, 200 U.S. Marines Land in Liberia to Aid African Force, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2003, at A4.
139. See Interim President Vows to Hand Over Ofªce on 14 October, AllAfrica.com, Aug. 28, 2003, at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200308280327.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2004) (discussing the plans for Blah
to give way to an elected government).
140. See Zakaria, supra note 30, at 256 (commenting on the necessity of “reintegrating constitutional
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for the institutionalization of such protections so as to lock future regimes
into positive human rights policies and the non-aggressive state behavior
associated therewith. Finally, a human rights informed foreign policy would
monitor for signals from Liberia of improving human rights—such as a more
liberal constitution or enhanced powers of judicial review—that would indicate a decreased propensity for aggressive behavior and, therefore, the possibility of a declining need for U.S. concern.
3. Russia-Chechnya
The Russia-Chechnya case demonstrates both the power and the limits of
a human rights-informed foreign policy. Russia has continued to engage in a
range of practices that violate the basic human rights of citizens in Chechnya. Though Russia’s 1999-2000 Freedom House score was a 4,5, “partially
free,” the NGO community has vigorously criticized its human rights practices in Chechnya. An April 2003 Human Rights Watch brieªng provides
evidence of at least three disappearances per week in Chechnya and “details
new cases of extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and torture.”141
Amnesty International has accused Russia of grave breaches of international
humanitarian law in the region.142 Though human rights abuses are largely
isolated in the Chechnya region, they suggest that Russia—or at least those
military elements operating unrestrained in the region—presents an aggressive threat.143
In relations with Russia, U.S. policymakers have largely overlooked Russian human rights practices in Chechnya due to Russia’s important role on
numerous issues—ranging from the intervention in Kosovo to the global
war on terror.144 When asked whether the United States was taking a softer
line with respect to Russian policy in Chechnya after a late September 2001
summit meeting between Bush and Putin, White House Spokesperson Ari
Fleischer noted “President Putin‘s offer of concrete cooperation in the comliberalism into the practice of democracy”).
141. Human Rights Watch, U.N. Should Censure Russia Over Chechnya Abuses, Apr. 10, 2003, available
at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/unchr041003.htm.
142. Amnesty International, Russian Federation: Chechnya For the Motherland, Reported Grave Breaches of
International Humanitarian Law, Dec. 1, 1999, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/
ENGEUR460461999 (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
143. This is not to say that Russia presently harbors aggressive intent against the United States.
Rather, the practices of the Russian military in Chechnya demonstrate, at the least, a lack of institutional
restraint and control. The fact that these military elements are able to repeatedly engage in human rights
violations is indicative that these same elements are capable of aggressive conduct—possibly without
central government approval—against surrounding populations and states.
144. A November 2001 Joint Statement by Presidents Bush and Putin is emblematic of this new relationship: “Our countries are embarked on a new relationship for the 21st century, founded on a commitment to the values of democracy, the free market, and the rule of law . . . . Aware of our responsibility to
contribute to international security, we are determined to work together, and with other nations and
international organizations, including the United Nations, to promote security, economic well-being,
and a peaceful, prosperous, free world.” Joint Statement on New U.S.-Russian Relationship, Nov. 13,
2001, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-4.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
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mon ªght against international terrorism” and observed that Bush “welcomes the sincere steps that have been taken by Russia to engage the Chechen
leadership.”145 Condoleezza Rice has taken a similar position, observing that
Bush would “discuss Chechnya in the following way—recognizing that terrorism can never be a legitimate method for any cause.”146 Abuses in Chechnya are simply not of overriding concern to U.S. policymakers.
The human rights-aggression linkage suggests that Russia—or at least
some elements of the Russian military—may present an aggressive threat.
As developed so far, a human rights informed foreign policy would place the
abuses in Chechnya higher in the U.S dialogue with Russia—not merely
mentioned as a side note, but integral to the future of U.S-Russia relations.
Taken to an extreme, a human rights informed foreign policy might even
condition issues of serious import to Russia—such as WTO accession or military cooperation—on improvements in human rights practices. To the degree that such policies reduce the likelihood of aggression by imposing checks
on the power of the government, they would enhance national security.
The Russia-Chechnya example, however, also demonstrates the limits of a
human rights-informed foreign policy. Admittedly, Russia is an important
strategic partner and alienating Russia might prove dangerous in the war on
terror or the prevention of nuclear proliferation. The unrestrained pursuit of
human rights in Chechnya might diminish, rather than enhance, national
security. What is needed, then, is intelligent and informed balancing that
recognizes both the need for Russian cooperation on a range of issues and the
potential aggressive threat posed by military elements engaging in human
rights abuse in Chechnya. In some cases, such as cooperation on nonproliferation, the pursuit of human rights may still give way. Still, by recognizing the aggressive threat associated with human rights violations, such
balancing would still place human rights in Chechnya far higher on the U.S.
agenda than it currently is. Such a policy would also look for signaling of
improved human rights practices in the region and respond by improving
the relationship or granting various beneªts to Russia.
V. Conclusion
Soon after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Michael Ignatieff
asked: “Is the Human Rights Era Ending?” He asserted that for the movement to remain relevant it has “to challenge directly the claim that national
security trumps human rights.”147 This article strives to do just that. It has
suggested a correlation between a state’s domestic human rights record and
its propensity to engage in international aggression. In the post–Cold War
145. Ari Fleischer, Press Brieªng, Sept. 26, 2001, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/
09/20010926-5.html#Chechnya-Russia (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
146. Condoleezza Rice, Press Brieªng, Nov. 15, 2002, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/11/20021115-1.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
147. Ignatieff, supra note 23.
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period, every instance of aggression was either initiated by a state that systematically denied the human rights of its own citizens or was undertaken
by a human rights respecting state at least in part to protect the human
rights of citizens in the target state. Taken in conjunction with the numerous statistical studies on the democratic peace phenomenon, these ªndings
appear likely to be accurate. Both institutional constraints and social beliefs
may offer causal mechanisms for this human rights peace. Additional studies, relying on political science methods of statistical regression analysis, will
be necessary to isolate other variables and prove the robustness of this correlation.
The strategic linkage between a state’s domestic human rights record and
its propensity for international aggression is sufªciently strong to advance
the claim that the international promotion of human rights is integral to
U.S. national security. By advancing the promotion of human rights around
the globe, the United States can decrease the likelihood of international aggression and thereby enhance national security. In the post–September 11
world, it is all the more important that the United States reject the traditional view that human rights and national security are in competition or
mutually exclusive and, instead, allow human rights to inform foreign policy. The resulting policy will not only reinvigorate the human rights movement, but will also make the United States more secure.

